An internal challenge is threatening to upend the SACP’s landmark decision to end its decades-long electoral alliance with the ruling ANC.
Blade Nzimande, the party’s national chairperson and a government minister, has called for an emergency congress to reverse the resolution, warning it risks shattering the governing tripartite alliance and isolating the communists from power.
The confrontation, detailed in a 14-page internal document, exposes an existential crisis for the SACP as it attempts to navigate a political landscape where its partner, the ANC, is visibly faltering.
Big dilemma for SACP
The communists’ dilemma — whether to remain inside a weakening alliance or risk a solo venture with no guarantee of success — mirrors that of left-wing parties globally that have long governed in coalition with broader movements.
Nzimande’s analysis presents a stark assessment of the SACP’s organisational readiness. It is citing “structural weaknesses”, “limited visibility”, and “fragile organisational capacity” as fundamental constraints. The document argues the party’s resolution to contest the 2026 local elections independently was based on a flawed analysis and has created confusion within its ranks, particularly over the principle of dual membership with the ANC.
The SACP’s predicament is not unique. The party finds itself in a classic political trap that has ensnared communist and socialist parties from India to Brazil. The choice is between the diminishing returns of a strategic alliance with a centrist partner and the high-risk, high-reward strategy of going it alone.
In India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), (CPI(M), provides a cautionary tale. For decades, it governed the state of West Bengal in a left-front coalition. It maintained a delicate balance of ideological purity and pragmatic administration. However, its eventual electoral collapse was spectacular. It was driven by a combination of alienated rural voters and a failure to adapt to a changing political economy.
The CPI(M) discovered that decades of incumbency, even in a subnational government, created entrenched opposition without guaranteeing lasting loyalty. Its identity became so fused with governance that it could not survive the backlash against its own policies.
Compromised by government failures
Similarly, in Brazil, the Communist Party of Brazil has faced continuous tension in its relationship with the Workers’ Party.
While the alliance provided access to power and policy influence during the Lula and Rousseff administrations, it also forced communists to compromise on core principles and share the blame for government failures. The party’s identity became diluted within the broader left coalition, leaving it struggling to maintain a distinct profile while avoiding the fate of a mere satellite organisation.
Nzimande’s document reveals similar concerns, noting that the SACP’s closest working-class ally, the trade union federation Cosatu, has not offered unequivocal support for the electoral split.
“Contesting elections without such support would amount to going it alone,” he writes, highlighting the risk of the SACP becoming politically isolated.
The South African communists now face three clear choices, each with profound implications.
The first option, advocated by Nzimande, is strategic retreat. This would involve reversing the decision to contest independently and returning to the alliance with renewed commitment to “revolutionary renewal” from within. This path offers the comfort of the known. But it risks appearing as a capitulation to a party base increasingly disillusioned with the ANC’s “ideological and moral degeneration”, as Nzimande himself acknowledges.
Taking the leap of faith?
The second option is the current course — pressing ahead with independent candidates despite the organisational weaknesses. This gamble echoes the approach of Nepal’s communist parties, which fragmented and recombined in various configurations in pursuit of electoral advantage.
The result has been periodic success. But also constant internal strife and ideological dilution. For the SACP, this path could mean short-term electoral disappointment but potential long-term growth as a distinct political force. This is provided it can survive the initial financial and organisational strain.
The third, more radical option would be a complete break, not just electorally but organisationally, from the ANC. This would mirror the path taken by some European communist parties after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which chose marginal ideological purity over the compromises of coalition government. The result was often political irrelevance. As seen with the French Communist Party’s steady decline after leaving government.
The SACP’s internal debate reflects a fundamental tension in left politics between access and influence.
“The resolution was insufficiently contextualised as a tactical instrument to advance working-class hegemony within, not outside, the Alliance,” Nzimande writes, advocating for a middle path that maintains the alliance while seeking to reform it.
The outcome of this confrontation will resonate beyond the SACP’s membership. South Africa’s working class, facing rampant unemployment and inequality, desperately needs effective political representation.
At the political crossroads
Many have grown disillusioned with the ANC’s embrace of market-friendly policies. Yet the SACP’s proposed alternative now appears fraught with organisational risk.
Nzimande’s document concludes with the Leninist maxim that “unity without ideological clarity is fragility, while ideological clarity without unity is futility.”
The SACP’s special national congress, if convened, will determine which path the communists choose. And whether they follow their international counterparts into the political wilderness or find a uniquely South African solution to the left’s perpetual governing dilemma.
